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ABSTRACT 
Ber t a l a n f f y ' s : "General System Theory" i s a recent attempt 
to produce a theory which has relevance to the t o t a l i t y of-
human knowledge. 
The l a c k of success i n such an endeavour i s due to the 
paradox encountered t h e r e i n . An analogous paradox, i s encount-
ered when viewing the photograph on page A. As one views 
the photograph, two. forms express themselves, ( a) 'faces' 
are r e a l i s e d at the expense of the vase, (b) the 'vase' i s 
r e a l i s e d a t the expense of the ' f a c e s ' . Such 'faces'/'vase' 
s i t u a t i o n s (opposing systems, opposing l o g i c s ) are encountered 
w i t h i n a l l "basic concepts. 
T h i s paradox i s i n v e s t i g a t e d hy study of more general 
l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t i n g to time, p r o b a b i l i t y and information and 
by way of symbolic l o g i c with i t s process of conceptual t r a n s -
formation from induction to deduction. 
The r e s u l t s of some experiments, on the phenomena of form 
are presented and are appli e d to biology through a consideration 
of the concept of evolution.. 
I t i s concluded that evolution i s a composite o f two 
p a r t s ; -
PAGE A 
Paces-Vase O p t i c a l I l l u s i o n s . 
A 
( 1 ) An in c r e a s e i n the d i v e r s i t y of the phenotypic 
screens adapting to the environment, ( t h a t i s e v o l -
u t i o n i n the Darwinian sense)., 
and (2) Inc r e a s e of the l i v i n g s t a t e on earth. The 'struggle' 
i s f o r maxim.um ' p o t e n t i a l ' of l i f e , maximum flov/ of 
energy through the evolving system, the biosphere. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Biology i s the scien c e which deals with the o r i g i n ( s ) , 
p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , e t c . , of p l a n t s and animals. Defined 
i n t h i s way the sc i e n c e i s immediately seen as a collage of 
sub - s c i e n c e s . Over the past I50 years the main development 
i n biology has been the fragmentation of the science i t s e l f 
i n t o many sub-units, botany, zoology, ecology, taxonomy, 
cytology, e t c . Each s u b - d i s c i p l i n e has developed i t s own. 
impetus and even a cursory look at the enormous l i t e r a t u r e 
shows that the main advances i n knowledge have come within the 
sub - d i s c i p l i n e s . . One main e f f e c t of t h i s has been to produce 
the 'new s p e c i a l i s t s ' , each adding t h e i r own momentum to t h i s 
d i v i s i v e p r o c e s s . This has gone hand i n hand with the deve l -
opment of a 'vacuum' of no n - r e l a t i o n s h i p s which now embrace 
and challenge the s u b j e c t i t s e l f . 
The reason f o r at l e a s t part of t h i s r e d u c t i o n i s t process 
i s the development of new techniques which ^llow us to 
comprehend s m a l l e r forms w i t h i n what to that time had been 
a homogeneous matrix. Once the techniques are a v a i l a b l e 
these sub-systems of form are amenable to study i n t h e i r ovm 
r i g h t , each generating t h e i r own data and r u l e s . 
The contemporary p r o l i f e r a t i o n of u n i v e r s i t y departments of 
Biology and Schools of B i o l o g i c a l Science, Wareing (I96U), would 
appear to be a r e v e r s a l of the main trend of reductionisra. 
Within these 
s c h o o l s , courses such as biochemistry, b i o p h y s i c s , e t c . , are 
often regarded as more b a s i c i n that they provide common 
/ 
ground, a common understanding w i t h i n the parent sciencCo 
This; i s i n i t s e l f a form of reductionism, i t i s however 
c o n s t r u c t i v e i n t h a t i t attempts to l i n k r a t h e r than i s o l a t e 
the sub-systems of form. 
One attempt at 'co n s t r u c t i v e reductionism* i s found i n 
Von. B e r t a a n f f y ' s General System Theory (1968), the c e n t r a l 
theme, of which i s b e s t expressed i n h i a own words; from "Robots, 
Men and Minds"' (19$7)« "General System Theory i s a d i s c i p l i n e 
concerned with the general p r o p e r t i e s and laws of systems'. 
Within the context of Biology, General System Theory supposes 
that w i t h i n and between each of the nes.ting 'black boxes' of 
form there are systems each of which has s i m i l a r p r o p e r t i e s 
and obey, v/ork to and e x h i b i t common laws. I t d i f f e r s from 
e a r l i e r attempts a t an a l l embracing theory of biology, such 
as Mechanism, Behaviourism, V i t a l i s m , which each t r y to ejcplain 
the phenomena of biology, they thus depend on knowledge of the 
system and are hence inductive» General System Theory i s 
deductive an absolute statement of the r u l e s or r u l e w ithin 
which the system operates and through whidh i t may be under-
stood o I t is; a t once obvious that a General System must be 
argued from the point of homology, the same r u l e or r u l e s 
p e r t a i n i n g to a l l systems, i t cannot be argued through analogy. 
Such a theory cannot s o r t analogies, i t must create an homology. 
The o r i g i n a l aim of the t h e s i s v/as to review the more 
general l i t e r a t u r e i n an attempt to define the general system 
f o r biology and apply i t to the main problem of biology, that, 
of,, the mechanism of e v o l u t i o n . 
T h i s b a s i c problem r e l a t i n g to evolution is; perhaps best 
summarised i n Borel's; (1956) work on P r o b a b i l i t y and C e r t a i n t y . 
R e f e r r i n g to the famous monkey/typewriter analogy he s t a t e s , 
"When we c a l c u l a t e d the p r o b a b i l i t y of reproducing by mere, 
chance a work, of l i t e r a t u r e , i n one or more volumes, we 
c e r t a i n l y observed t h a t , i f t h i s work was p r i n t e d , i t must 
have o r i g i n a l l y emanated from a human b r a i n . Now the complexity 
of that b r a i n must t h e r e f o r e have been even r i c h e r than the 
p a r t i c u l a r work to which i t gave b i r t h . I s i t not p o s s i b l e 
to i n f e r that the p r o b a b i l i t y that t h i s b r a i n may have been 
produced by the b l i n d f o r c e s of chance i s even s l i g h t e r than 
the p r o b a b i l i t y of the t y p e w r i t i n g m i r a c l e ? . 
I t is; obviously the same as i f we asked ourselves 
whether we could know i f i t was p o s s i b l e a c t u a l l y to create a 
human being by combining at random a c e r t a i n number of simple 
bpdies.. ieiut t h i s i s not the way the problem of the o r i g i n of 
l i f e p r e s e n t s i t s e l f , i t i s g e n e r a l l y held that l i v i n g beings 
are the r e s u l t of a slow process of evolution, beginning with 
elementary organisms, and that t h i s process of evolution 
i n v o l v e s c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s of l i v i n g matter that prevent us 
from a s s e r t i n g that the process was accomplished i n accordance 
with the lav;s of chance. 
Moreover, c e r t a i n of these p r o p e r t i e s of l i v i n g matter-
a l s o belong to inanimate matter, when i t takes c e r t a i n forms, 
such as that of c r y s t a l s . I t does not seem p o s s i b l e to apply 
the laws of p r o b a b i l i t y , c a l c u l u s , to the phenomenon of the 
formation of a c r y s t a l i n a more or l e s s supersaturated 
s o l u t i o n . At l e a s t , l i t would not be p o s s i b l e to t r e a t t h i s 
problem of p r o b a b i l i t y without taking account of c e r t a i n 
p r o p e r t i e s that f a c i l i t a t e the formation of c r y s t a l s and that 
we are c e r t a i n l y obliged to v e r i f y . We ought, i t seems to me, 
to consider i t l i k e l y t h a t the formation of elementary l i v i n g 
organisms;, and the evolution of those organisms, are also 
governed by elementary p r o p e r t i e s of matter that we do not 
understand p e r f e c t l y but whose existence we nevertheless- ought 
to admit". 
The t h e s i s i s set out i n the order of progression of the 
work through study of the l i t e r a t u r e , 
PART I 
A p p r a i s a l of the v a l i d i t y of the concept of a general 
ssrstem and problems a s s o c i a t e d with i t , ( i t v/as soon r e a l -
i s e d t h at one of the main problems was that of l o g i c i n approach. 
Study of the concept of l o g i c appeared to be of importance and 
was t h e r e f o r e undertaken. An account of t h i s i s given i n 
Appendix 1 as although i t i s of i n t e r e s t to the main p a r t of 
the t h e s i s i t i s not w i t h i n the main stream of the d i s c u s s i o n , 
PART I I 
At t h i s point i n the study the experimental techniques 
described i n Cymatics Jenny (196O) appeared to be of relevance 
to a f u l l e r understanding of the problem. An experiment was 
t h e r e f o r e c a r r i e d out and the r e s u l t s are presented. 
PART I I I 
Consideration of the evolutionary theory i n the l i g h t 
of the above. 
The l i t e r a t u r e to which d i r e c t reference i s made i n the 
te x t i s given together with a bibliography which l i s t s the 
background reading c a r r i e d out during the course of t h i s 
work. 
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PART I TOWARDS A GENERAL SYSTEM 
Study of a whole cr o s s s e c t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e (see B i b l i o -
graphy) showed that the concept of time was common to a l l 
s c i e n t i f i c endeavour, Haldane ( 1951)• This appeared to be espe-
c i a l l y true f o r biology where the evolutionary development of 
l i v i n g things i s a f u n c t i o n of time, Darwin ( 1 8 5 9 ) , Wells e t a l 
(1931), Thompson (l9i|2), Blum ( 1 9 5 1 ) , \Vhitrow ( 1 9 5 9 ) , Olson (1966) 
Lerner (1968), O'Manique (1969)0 Consideration of the concept 
of time was thus taken as a s t a r t i n g point f o r the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
THE. CONCEPT OF TIME 
The .'concept of timec' has been subject matter f o r consid-
e r a t i o n and d i s c u s s i o n over many thousands of years.' The 
contemporary ' i n t u i t i v e l y obvious' conception of time as a 
c o n t i n u a l l i n e a r progression i s h i s t o r i c a l l y speaking a very 
recent innovation. Although the development of t h i s contemp-
orary view i s w e l l documented, Vftiitrow (196I), Brandon (I956), 
i t i s key to an understanding of the fol l o w i n g discourse and 
w i l l therefore be o u t l i n e d below. 
Phase I 
Many of- the e a r l y and" contemporary ' p r i m i t i v e ' c u l t u r e s 
viev/ed and view time as being c y c l i c i n nature. The Mayan 
c u l t u r e , Thompson (1969), of the 15*^ and l 6 * ^ c e n t u r i e s best 
e x e m p l i f i e s t h i s p o i n t . Time to the Mayan was d i v i n e . Each 
day, moment, year, e t c . , was a god unto i t s e l f , and each god 
c a r r i e d h i s d i v i s i o n of time as a burden i n a long r e l a y l i k e 
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i s a b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e , comprehension i s a one way s t a t e , 
comprehension by a system (the unique q u a l i t y to a system). 
Wherass 'information' would appear to have a much more r e a l 
e x i s t e n c e , 'information' from a system passed to a system. 
I t t h e r e f o r e becomes easier; to step outside "the concept of 
the word 'information' and view i t as a'quantity of information" 
Yockey (1956) r a t h e r than the ' q u a l i t y of comprehension'. I f 
we do t h i s we are at once faced with two s o r t s of information. 
An example, i n order to define a random system, more 
a p r i o r i questions must be asked i n order to describe, under-
stand the system, when compared with a l e s s random system. I t 
would seem that random systems must contain more information. 
That t h i s 'contained information' (from here on designated by 
c a p i t a l l e t t e r s ) i s redundant to the comprehending systegi 
does not matter, i t i s p a r t of the whole. 
The b a s i c problem i s the system of containment. T h i s 
systematised, q u a n t i f i e d , integrated p a r t of the information, 
i s the information which i s comprehended by other systems. 
The conveyed information becomes a system with i t s own 
q u a l i t y (with i t s own l o g i c ) which can be understood. The 
e r r o r i n any system i s the other ' s t a t e s ' , the r e s t of the 
INFORMATION that i s excluded , or that i s not comprehended by 
the i n t e g r a t i n g system. (Time i s never comprehended, the 
systems are comprehended thus allowing the concept of t i m e ) . 
The problem can perhaps be r e s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : The greater 
number of allowed s t a t e s In which the components of a system 
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p r o c e s s i o n . The burdens o f the multitude of gods s i g n i f i e d 
a p a r t i c u l a r omen that was c a l c u l a t e d i n the l i g h t of the over-
a l l i n f l u e n c e that the p a r t i c u l a r combination of gods exerted 
at the moment i n question. Such combinations were expected 
to repeat themselves i n exact combinations every 260 y e a r s . 
Thus p a s t events were studied and considered to repeat themtr 
s e l v e s a d - i n f i n i t u m . 
V/hether the changing of the seasons or the awareness 
of b i r t h and death, provided the stimulus f o r such reasoning 
i s d i f f i c u l t to deduce. However there i s l i t t l e doubt that 
siorae n a t u r a l c y c l i c a l process must have been the environ-
mental stimulus which r e s u l t e d i n t h i s i d e a . 
Phase I I 
The i n f l u e n c e of astronomy (the study of c e l e s t i a l 
o c c urrences) was o r i g i n a l l y emphasised i n the. Chaldean c u l t u r e . 
The b a s i c idea of the Chaldeans, Brandon (1965), was that a l l 
events on e a r t h were influenced by the c e l e s t i a l bodies. The 
o r i g i n of the present naming of our seven day week has been 
t r a c e d to the disc o v e r y by the Chaldeans of the f i v e p l a n e t s 
together with the sun and moon. I t was i n the t h i r d or fourt h 
century A.D,.,, t h a t the C h r i s t i a n s changed from the simple 
numbering of the days of the week to the naming of the days 
as; advocated by the Chaldeans. 
Phase I I I 
The Hebrew and Zo r o a s t r i a n I r a n i a n philosophers by v/ay 
of t h e i r progressive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l occurrences 
provided the o r i g i n o f the C h r i s t i a n concept of time, 
Brandon (1965). 
Phase IV 
The C h r i s t i a n s , Case (1914-3), Quispel (195U), enforced 
an;d extended the l i n e a r view hy regarding the C r u c i f i x i o n as 
unique, thus never subject t o r e p e t i t i o n . All subsequent events 
Were also considered as unique and non-repeating, '^'an now 
had a say i n h i s d e s t i n y , whereas the c y c l i c view predefined 
over d e s t i n y . Thus the l i n e a r view of time confronted and 
eve n t u a l l y replaced the c y c l i c view, ( i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o 
note t h a t t he c y c l i c view of time was p o l y t h e i s t i c , whereas 
the l i n e a r view of time was mon o t h e i s t i c ) . 
Phase V 
Up t i l l the 17^^ and 18^^ ce n t u r i e s , philosophy, l i t e r a t u r e , 
a r t and c u l t u r e i n general abounded w i t h mixed or singular 
I 
approaches t o the c y c l i c and l i n e a r concepts of time. However-
from the beginning of the 17*^ century the c y c l i c a l view of 
time was gradually replaced by the l i n e a r view. Through the 
work and thought of Kepler ( I 5 7 I - I 6 3 0 ) , Boyle ( I 6 2 7 - I 6 9 I ) , 
Pascal (1623-1660), L e i b n i t z ( I 6 i j . 6 - I 7 l 6 ) , Barrow (I63O-I677), 
Loche (1632-1704) and the in v e n t i o n of the mechanical clock 
by Huygen, the l i n e a r concept of time became f i r m l y entrenched 
i n modern philosophy, Before the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the 
mechanical clock the l i n e a r conception of time was. as some-
t h i n g discontinuous and uneven. Then w i t h the in v e n t i o n of 
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the mechanical clock (which was to provide the bases f o r the 
mechanistic conception of nature i n n a t u r a l philosophy) time, 
acquired i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f c o n t i n u i t y . 
Eathematicsi and Time. 
The obvious .analogy o f l i n e a r time and mathematics can 
be t r a c e d t o G a l i l e o and h i s consideration of the p e r i o d i c 
o s ; c i l l a t i o n s of the pendulumo His t h e o r i e s on motion found 
i n h i s t e x t , "Discourses, on Two New Sciences" (published 
between I636-9) implied the concept of mathematical time w i t h 
i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c o n t i n u i t y 9 constancy and u n i f o r m i t y . 
The e a r l i e s t e x p l i c i t statement of the concept of time 
i s found i n Barrow's "Geometrical Lectures" (1735). Barrow's 
concept posseses c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t were analogous t o a 
mathematical l i n e w i t h regard t o i t s c o n t i n u i t y , u n i f o r m i t y , 
equal segmentations; and l e n g t h , the a d d i t i v e nature of each 
segmentation t o produce, a continuous, whole. Newton, who 
succeeded Barrow t o the Chair of Mathematics at Cambridge 
i n 1669, was g r e a t l y influenced by Barrow's concept of time 
and i n h i s t e x t " P r i n c i p i a " ( I 6 8 7 ) , he adds an a d d i t i o n a l 
character t o the concept of mathematical time. This character 
being the absolute existence of time i n i t s own r i g h t . I n 
h i s own words.: "Absolute time and mathematical time of i t s e l f 
and from i t s own nature, flows equably without r e l a t i o n t o 
anything external**'. 
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The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Challenge 
' The world of philosophy, l e d by L e i b n i t z , challenged 
Newton's concept w i t h great v i g o u r . The reason was t h a t the 
concept of the absolute nature of time created a vast number 
of d i f f i c u l t and p e r p l e x i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems. L e i b n i t z 
(1968) advocated a d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t o replace 
Newton's absolute, yet he d i d not challenge the whole body 
of p r o p o s i t i o n s up t o and i n c l u d i n g some of Newton's ideas 
d e a l i n g w i t h the l i n e a r concept of time. L e i b n i t z proposed 
t h a t the human species defines time from and by the presen-
t a t i o n s of phenomena but t h a t phenomena are not derived from 
time i n the absolute sense. This idea acquired the t i t l e of. 
"The R e l a t i o n a l Theory of Time", Margenau (1950). 
. The most recent, a d d i t i o n t o the l i n e a r concept of time 
was made by E i n s t e i n (1956, 1964) i n h i s "Theory of R e l a t i v i t y " , 
I n the p u r s u i t of h i s studies on the phenomena of motion and 
l i g h t , the problem of 'instantaneous occurrences' of phenomena 
as- experienced by observers i n d i f f e r e n t geographical l o c a t i o n s 
became apparent. I n h i s "General Theory of R e l a t i v i t y " 
E i n s t e i n n e u t r a l i s e d the idea of time being u n i v e r s a l l y 
simultaneous f o r a l l mankind regardless of geographical 
placement and p o s i t i o n i n g . The ordering of events depend upon 
the observer and the r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t e x i s t s between space 
and t i m e , Eisenhart (I966), a r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s so 
i n t i m a t e t h a t one complements the other. Thus the concept 
of space became an i n t e g r a l p a r t i n ,the conception of time 
and as. Minkowski (1923) has pointed out, "no on& has ever 
12 
n o t i c e d a place except at ""a time nor yet a time except at a 
place"o 
Perhaps the most important p a r t o f t h a t statement i s the 
'no one'., the acceptance of a system which delineates both 
time and space. The great advancement i n the measurement 
( d e l i n e a t i o n ) of time w i t h the i n v e n t i o n of the caesium clock 
by Essen, Whitrow (I96I), i s of i n t e r e s t . The caesium clock 
works on the p r i n c i p l e t h a t the caesium atom produces e l e c t r o -
magnetic waves of about. 9,200 megacycles per second corres-
ponding t o a wavelength o f about 3-4 cm. The waves, are a 
r e s u l t o f the change i n d i r e c t i o n of the outermost e l e c t r o n 
t h a t the caesium atom posseses. Small amounts of energy are 
used t o change the d i r e c t i o n of the spin so th a t i t i s opposite 
to the spin of the nucleus, i n a very short time the e l e c t r o n 
again reverses i t s spin t o coincide w i t h t h a t of the nucleus, 
and i n the process an electromagnetic wave i s produced, v/hioh 
may be picked up and a m p l i f i e d . The e r r o r i n such a clock 
i s about one second i n 30,000 years.. I t should be noted 
however t h a t the e r r o r i s c a l c u l a t e d i n r e l a t i o n to our previous 
methods ( c e l e s t i a l , astronomical, mechanical) of d e l i n e a t i n g 
time* The caesium clock i s i n essence a refinement of p r e -
d i c t i n g our human imposed d e l i n e a t i o n s . 
Here i s the basis of a paradox i n l o g i c . Time, considered 
as a c i r c u l a r phenomenon allows the p r e d i c t i o n of other pheno-
mena, " i t has happened before, i t w i l l happen again". The 
planets r e v o l v e , day f o l l o w s n i g h t , eclipses, can be pr e d i c t e d . 
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c i r c u l a r time allows absolute r u l e s , condoning d i v i n a t i o n . 
Time considered as a l i n e a r phenomena, does not allow absolute 
p r e d i c t i o n , d i v i n a t i o n i s replaced by hypothesis, hypothesis 
based on s t a t i s t i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y . However as soon as time i s 
measured, e i t h e r by reference t o the r e v o l u t i o n of the planets 
or the change i n spin of the e l e c t r o n , i t i s q u a n t i f i e d i n t o 
u n i t s of r e p i t i t i o n . One second follov/s another, each second 
i s s i m i l a r , q u a n t i f i c a t i o n i s c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n , c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n 
supports d i v i n a t i o n . 
Time i s the basic d e l i n e a t i o n , but as soon as we attempt 
t o contain i t , q u a n t i f y i t , measure i t , we conceptualise subr-
systems each w i t h t h e i r own p r e d i c t i v e l o g i c . Restated, time 
i s an absolute f o r a l l systems, an homologue f o r a l l systems. 
The paradox i s , t h a t time measured by any one system becomes 
a unique f u n c t i o n of t h a t system. The e r r o r l i e s , i n measure-
ment. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o speculate t h a t as time i t s e l f 
has no existence outside a system of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n , the e r r o r 
and time become synonymous, 
KnoY/ledge Versus Hypothesis 
I n the year 1924, Heisenberg (1969a & b) introduced a 
new and provocative p r o p o s i t i o n i n t o t h e o r e t i c a l physics, 
Heisenberg's p r o p o s i t i o n which has come to be known as the 
'Uncertainty P r i n c i p l e ' states th a t any act of measurement 
d i s t u r b s the process t o such a degree t h a t i t , introduces 
changes and e r r o r t o the t r u e q u a n t i t i e s of the process 
under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . To measure any v e l o c i t y 'X' of a 
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p a r t i c l e , a short x-ray wave, l e n g t h i s r e q u i r e d . The p a r t i c l e 
r e t r a c t s or r e c o i l s from the impinging ray, thus producing 
u n c o n t r o l l a b l e e f f e c t s on the momentum of the p a r t i c l e under 
observation, 
Bohr extended Heisenberg's P r i n c i p l e t o define the ,wh§>ie 
context o f physics, Eddington (1935), a d e s c r i p t i o n containing 
o n l y p r o p o s i t i o n s of concious: knowledge and observations of 
phenomena. Not 'the' i n the absolute sense knowledge, know-
ledge of a phenomena or p a r t i c l e . Von Neumann (1955) pro-
vided the necessary t h e o r e t i c a l (mathematical) l o g i c t h a t 
s u b s t a n t i a t e s the existence of the p r o p o s i t i o n of Heisenberg 
and Bohr. 
Thus the c l a s s i c a l view, of cause-and-effect was relegated 
t o a pej'orative form of consideration and the laws of 
p r o b a b i l i t y were elevated t o t h e i r present m e l i o r a t i v e form 
of acceptance. D i v i n i t i v e physics based on l o g i c a l sub-systems 
v/as replaced by laws delineated by s t a t i s t i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y , 
Margenau (1950), the laws of quantum mechanics. As f a r as 
quantum mechanics i s concerned, the idea of a p h y s i c a l r e a l i t y 
i s renounced as a metaphysical inderterminate. 
The discussion has i n f a c t returned to the problem of 
Minkowski's a s s e r t i o n , "no one has ever, seen a place except 
at a time, nor a time except at a place". Again the most 
p r o b l e m a t i c a l p a r t of the statement would appear to be the 
•no one', t h a t i s the system v/hich i n t e r p r e t s the phenomena 
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or a t l e a s t the s t a t i s t i c s . The accrual o f s t a t i s t i c s on 
r e c u r r e n t phenomena (eg. the r e v o l u t i o n of the pla n e t s ) 
leads t o q u a n t i f i c a t i o n and hence the acceptance of the 
concept of time as a q u a l i t y of the system. E i n s t e i n has 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t q u a l i t y i s a unique f u n c t i o n o f the system of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t seems impossible t o get away from the 
f a c t t h a t once a system has been chosen i t ( l ) assumes 
unique fe a t u r e s and (2) excludesother systems. 
Quantity. Q u a l i t y and Systems of I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
Q u a n t i t a t i v e data ( s t a t i s t i c s ) allow systems, of r e p e t i t i o n 
feo be understood, t o be given q u a l i t y . I f there i s no 
r e p e t i t i o n , no p a t t e r n , no 'system', accrued s t a t i s t i c s 
cannot r e v e a l q u a l i t y . No p a t t e r n , no system, no r e p e t i t i o n 
means d i s o r d e r , and disorder t o the system of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
i s synonymous w i t h ignorance. 
Form, order, p a t t e r n , system then becomes synonymous 
w i t h ' i n f o r m a t i o n ' (neg-entropy of Schrttdinger, I967) and 
though the system of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is: synonymous w i t h 
comprehension, comprehension of q u a l i t y . But i s comprehension 
the same as 'information'? The answer i s no. The e r r o r i s 
i n the anthromorphism, the system, which i n t e g r a t e s the i n f o r -
mation, ( i n mathematical l o g i c i n t e g r a t i o n i s the method by 
which something whole, or undivided, i s produced.) I t must 
be accepted t h a t w i t h i n the word 'information' there i s also 
t h i s anthropomorphism, eg. i n f o r m a t i o n , t o what? Hov/ever there 
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i s a basic d i f f e r e n c e , comprehension i s a one way s t a t e , 
comprehension by a system (the unique q u a l i t y to a system), 
Yi/hereas.'information' would appear to have a much more r e a l 
existence, 'information' from a system passed to a system. 
I t t h e r e f o r e becomes easier to step outside "the concept of 
the word 'information' and view i t as a q u a n t i t y of information" 
Yockey (1956) r a t h e r than the ' q u a l i t y of comprehension'. 
I f we do t h i s we are a t once faced w i t h two sorts of info r m a t i o n . 
An example, i n order t o define a random syste, more 
a p r i o r i questions must be asked i n order t o describe, under-
stand the system, when compared wit h a. l e s s random system. 
Here the random system must contain more inf o r m a t i o n . That 
t h i s 'contained i n f o r m a t i o n ' (from here on designated by 
c a p i t a l l e t t e r s ) is; redundant t o the comprehending system 
does not matter, i t i s p a r t of the whole. 
The basic problemsls the pystera of containment. This 
systematised, q u a n t i f i e d , i n t e g r a t e d p a r t of the i n f o r m a t i o n , 
i s the in f o r m a t i o n which i s comprehended by other systems. 
The conveyed infor m a t i o n becomes a sj'-stem w i t h i t s own 
q u a l i t y ( w i t h i t s own l o g i c ) which can be understood. The 
e r r o r i n any system i s the other ' s t a t e s ' , the r e s t of the 
INFORMATION t h a t i s excluded, or th a t i s not conprehended by 
the i n t e g r a t i n g system. (Time i s never comprehended, the 
systems are comprehended thus allowing the concept of t i m e ) . 
The problem can perhaps be r e s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : The greater 
number of allowed states i n which the components of a system 
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can e x i s t , the greater the number of questions v/hich must 
be asked, i n order to delineate the states i n a comprehendable 
system. That i s , the more random the system i s , the greater 
i s the contained INFBRMATION, but the less i s i t s conveyed 
i n f o r m a t i o n . 
Any system (form) conveys INFORMATION, but only information 
r e l a t i n g to tha t system. The information i s more fundamental, 
because under another d e l i n e a t i o n i t can convey other i n f o r -
mation. Systemization i s the s t r u c t u r i n g of the in f o r m a t i o n , 
but the system never contains a l l the inf o r m a t i o n . This i s 
i m p l i c i t i n Godel's theorem, Newman (196O), "that a mathe-
m a t i c a l system cannot be s e l f - d e s c r i p t i v e , a i l the r u l e s 
necessary f o r d e s c r i b i n g the system cannot be stated w i t h i n 
the system". 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to speculate t h a t s t a t i s t i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y 
depends of accrued i n f o r m a t i o n , the chance of gathering 
s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n to allow ' s t a t i s t i c a l comprehension' 
increases w i t h time. Time i s thus again the e r r o r i n any 
d e l i n e a t i o n . More time would allov; f u r t h e r data t o be accrued 
and hence other forms, systems, other p a r t s of the information 
could become s t a t i s t i c a l l y meaningful (comprehendable). 
Here i s the basic problem of a general system:- A general 
system theory can only be formulated i n r e l a t i o n to the 
•.available knowledge. I t s l i m i t a t i o n s are thus set and i t 
must be appreciated t h a t (1) great care must be taken i n 
18 
applying i t outside t h a t sphere of knowledge, (2) new 
knowledge must not be adapted t o conform to the general system, 
but t h a t the system must be modified to contain t h a t know-
ledge. At t h i s p o i n t i n the study c e r t a i n p a r a l l e l s i n 
' l o g i c ' become evident, these are discussed i n Appendix 1. 
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PART I I AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
At t h i s stage i n the study the p u b l i c a t i o n s of Hans 
Jenny (1967, 69 & 70) i n which he describes experiments 
c a r r i e d out w i t h a piece of apparatus, the Tonoscope, appeared 
to be of relevance. 
The Tonoscope i s an apparatus which not only allov/s form 
to be observed, but allows form t o be manipulated, thus 
p e r m i t t i n g the study of the processes of change. 
The Tonoscope p r o j e c t s sound (acoustical, v i b r a t i o n s 
which possess wave-like p r o p e r t i e s ) onto, a diaphragm. The 
diaphragm can be made of any tjrpe of m a t e r i a l v/hich i s 
capable of t r a n s m i t t i n g the a c o u s t i c a l v i b r a t i o n s t o the 
medium, which i s placed on the diaphragm. The medium i s 
randomly spread on the diaphragm (N.B. the medium cannot be 
p e r f e c t l y random, as i t i s ordered w i t h respect to the 
diaphragm and t o g r a v i t y ) . Under ac o u s t i c a l s t i m u l a t i o n 
the medium r a p i d l y loses i t s two-dimensional randomness, and 
a comprehendable form takes shape on the membrane. 
The form of the complex of v i b r a t i o n s of the diaphragm 
i s t r a n s l a t e d by the medium i n t o form which can be corapre-
headed by v i s i o n of any of i t s extensions (photography, 
cinematography, a r t , e t c . ) . The comprehension of the form 
can be extended by using any o p t i c a l technique (stroboscope, 
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high-speed photography and m a g n i f i c a t i o n ) , e.g. any o p t i c a l 
system between the sig n a l . o f form and the i n t e g r a t i n g system, 
the complex of the human eye and b r a i n . 
I n . t he sense of the above discussion, the media i s the 
INFORMATION, a p a r t of which i s s t r u c t u r e d i n t o i n f o r m a t i o n . 
Pages AA-DD show the r e s u l t s of an experiment in..avhlch 
two Tonoscopes (a. round form ( l e f t - h a n d side of pages AA-DD; 
b. square form (r i g h t - h a n d side of pages AA-DD)) were used. 
I n both cases the membrane was rubber and the media was sand. 
F u l l , d e t a i l s of the experimental conditions are given i n the 
f o l l o v / i n g t a b l e : 
Round 
Form Tonoscope 
Square 
Form Tonoscope 
Page Photo Frequency Photo Frequenc 
(c .p. s. (c.p'.s.) 
AA a-1 165 a-11 165 
AA b-2 270 b-22 270 
AA c-3 275 c-33 275 
BB d-4 340 d-44 340 
BB e-5 425 e-55 425 
BB f-6 520 f - 6 6 520 
CC g-7 610 g-77 610 
CG h-8 710 h-88 710 
GC i -9 820 i-99 820 
DD d-10 890 j - i e e 890 
DD k-11 960 k-111 960 
DD 1-12 1200 1-122 1200 
Tension: Round and Square (Form) 
Tonoscope - 59 mm 
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The two series of photographs can be viewed as a .record 
of change w i t h respect t o Increasing frequencies. I f an 
observer were given the photographs i n random order, i t vvould 
be a simple task t o arrange them i n t o a sequence of changes, 
a sequence of development of form. I f the photographs are 
viewed c a r e f u l l y , the r e s i d u a l media can however, be seen 
e x l s i n g in.-^a more random s t a t e . This i s made much clearer by 
viewing the colo u r e d - f i x e d p l a t e . (This was produced v/lth 
coloured media (sand) and an adhesive coloured p l a t e ) . 
There i s only one problem i n a l l s t a t i c methods of 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a great deal i s hidden. The k i n e t i c phenomena 
displayed by the media are l i s t e d below:-
K i n e t i c phenomena of the media 
Pu l s a t i o n 
R o t a t i o n 
See-saw e f f e c t 
Circula'tion, w i t h i n the forms, f i g u r e s , p a t t e r n s . 
Constancy o f the m a t e r i a l i n a system 
I n t e g r a t i o n e f f e c t 
I n d i v i d u a t i o n 
Dynamics of er u p t i o n 
Dynamics of current f l o w e t c . 
Conjoining: and d i s j o i n i n g of a single mass 
The order of patterned areas 
The c r e a t i o n of f i g u r e s 
The c r e a t i o n of forms 
These ' e f f e c t s ' must be borne i n mind, but f u r t h e r 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f them at t h i s p o i n t i n unnecessary. The 
f a c t i s t h a t the more random matrix of INFORMATION i s there 
subtending the i n f o r m a t i o n i n the comprehendable form. 
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Returning to the two s e r i e s , the t o t a l i t y of the INFORM-
TION remains. There are however, two important features of 
the two s e r i e s : 
(a) t h a t i n each s e r i e s , at c e r t a i n frequencies, the 
system of form ( i n f o r m a t i o n ) breaks up i n t o sub-systems of 
form ( i n f o r m a t i o n ) . The problem then becomes whether t o 
study the sub-system, or the whole, or a combination of the 
twa. I t i s important to note that i f the sub-systems are 
studied separately, each possesses the same pr o p e r t i e s as 
the whole, INFORMATION' and in f o r m a t i o n . I t i s also important 
to note t h a t although the sub-systems contain less INFORMATION, 
the form of the sub-system can be j u s t as complex as the 
form of the o r i g i n a l whole. Compare the sub-system ringed 
i n F i g . L-122 w i t h the gross form of A-11. So again the 
i n i t i a l d e l i n e a t i o n of what system t o study (what l o g i c t o 
use), becomes a l l important. I n t h i s case reductionism 
reduces only the context of the system, i t does not necess-
a r i l y produce simpler systems of comprehension, 
(b) The d i f f e r e n c e , but p a r a l l e l i s m , between the forms 
produced on the round and square form Tonoscopes. 
The only d i f f e r e n c e i n the 'developing' series (pages AA-
DD) i s the increased frequency ( o f i n p u t ) , which can be regarded 
as am increased number of disturbances of the membrane, hence 
media i n u n i t time. This could be regarded as an increase i n 
energy a c t i v a t i n g the membrane, hence the media. The 'free 
energy' of' the media i s increased (see l i s t of k i n e t i c 
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phenomena above), the INFORMATION of the system decreases, as• 
more complex forms develop. 
The Tonoscope thus allows at le a s t some basic study of 
the phenomena of form. I f an observer were given the . 
photographs AA-DD i n random order i t would be a simple 
matter t o arrange them i n a sequence of the development of 
more complex forms. Given a time scale (and perhaps b i o l o g i c a l 
t r a i n i n g ) the concept of e v o l u t i o n would manifest i t s e l f . 
PAGES AA-DD 
Experimental Data f o r the Thesis. 
Tables provided i n Thesis, Page 20, 
fl i! 
a_1l 
b_2 b_2 2 
c_33 
BB 
d_44 
e_5 e_55 
f_66 
CO 
g.7 g_77 
h-8 h_88 
JJO J_100 
7 0 
k _ i i k _ i i i 
L12 L122 
PAGE FF 
Coloured Fixed Plate containing a Fixed 
"Pattern" (sand), produced "by a S p e c i f i c 
A c o u s t i c a l V i b r a t i o n by way of the 
Tonoscope. 
I 
F F 
2h 
PART I I I BIOLOGY. EVOLUTION. A GENERAL SYSTEM? 
Biology i s the study of the form of l i v i n g t h i n g s , 
Thompson (1942)o I t s various sub-disciplines study form at 
d i f f e r e n t levels o This has i n the main been made possible 
by the development of apparatus and techniques which have 
increased the r e s o l u t i o n of the human eye and allowed other 
s t r u c t u r e s to be seen or comprehended where before no s t r u c t u r e 
or form was comprehendable. Biology contains one main l i n k i n g 
l o g i c , a general system c a l l e d ' e v o l u t i o n ' , Simpson (1965), 
Only t h i s provides a w h o l i s t i c counterbalance to the reduc-
t i o n i s t approach which t y p i f i e s the subject today. 
By reviewing analogies i n the developed forms seen against 
the background of time i t e l e g a n t l y explains the d i v e r s i t y 
and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of organismsi This i s i m p l i c i t ; - i n the 
t i t l e of Darwin's main work on evolution-"On the o r i g i n of 
species by means of n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n " . The concept of s e l e c t i o n 
invokes something to be selected from, i t does not explain 
the e v o l u t i o n of t h a t something. Darwin's publishers added 
the s u b - t i t l e - " P r e s e r v a t i o n of favoured races i n the struggle 
f o r l i f e " , which was bastardised through a statement of 
Y/allace, " t h a t the f i t t e s t would survive" i n t o the dogma 
of " s u r v i v a l of the f i t t e s t i n the struggle f o r existence". 
Yet i t i s only t h i s dogma t h a t r e a l l y attempts: to i d e n t i f y 
a d r i v e (something t o be struggled f o r ) behind the evolutionary 
process. 
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Neo-Darwinism has continued the r e d u c t i o n i s t approach 
to the problem, Waddington (1969, 1970). Within the sub-
systems of the gene pools, i t inv'okes passive n a t u r a l selec-
t i o n through d i f f e r e n t i a l reproduction as being the mechanism 
of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . The mechanism f o r d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i s 
however not the same as the d r i v e of e v o l u t i o n . 
The system of e v o l u t i o n i s manifested and understood as 
change through time. The importance of the system of evol u t i o n 
would thus appear t o be the transformation of one form i n t o 
another (the o r i g i n of species) producing d i v e r s i t y both i n 
space and time. Herein l i e s the paradox. I n the Darwinian 
sense, t h a t which has changed has not survived, so i t does 
not bear the stamp of f i t n e s s . Likewise t h a t which has not 
changed, although i t bears the stamp of success, has not 
evolvedo 
Returning t o the experiment. The only d i f f e r e n c e i n the 
'evolving' s e r i e s (photographs AA-DD) i s the increased frequency 
of input which can be regarded as an increased number o f 
disturbiances of the membrane, hence media i n u n i t time. The 
f r e e energy of the media i s increased (see the l i s t of k i n e t i c 
phenomena), the IMFORMATION decreases as more complex forms 
develop. The greater the amount of energy d i s s i p a t e d by the 
membrane the more complex i s the t o t a l form produced. This 
is. reminiscent of the l i v i n g s t a t e . L i f e maintains high 
l e v e l s of f r e e energy and low le v e l s of entropy (SchrB^dinger 
1967). E v o l u t i o n m.oves t o more complex systems which require . 
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a gre a t e r f l o w of energy f o r maintenance. 
Whichever view of ev o l u t i o n i s taken, two features are 
held i n common, ( l ) An increasing complexity. (2) Ah 
incr e a s i n g d i s s i p a t i o n , (degradation sensu Clausius ( l § 6 5 ) ) 
of energy. Heat i s considered as the most degraded form o f 
energy, i n t h a t the energy represents the random movement 
( a g i t a t i o n ) of molecules, the movement slowly decreasing as 
the temperature approaches O^ A. This reduction i n movement 
reduces the chance of molecular contact and hence of chemical 
r e a c t i o n which would produce more ordered systems. 
The evolving system i s placed under the co n s t r a i n t of 
in c r e a s i n g degradation of energy, the heat released being of 
key importance only i n the l i f e processes of the complex, 
advanced homiotherms. Any system placed under a co n s t r a i n t 
must according to Le Cha t e l i e r ' s P r i n c i p l e , De Groots (1952) 
act t o n u l l i f y t h a t c o n s t r a i n t . 
Y/ithin the surface environment of earth, w i t h i t s range 
of temperature which i s low enough t o allow the existence 
of m.acromolecules, the evolving system can only respond to; 
n u l l i f y t he c o n s t r a i n t of increased degradation of energy by 
s t o r i n g i t i n the form of ordered systems o f macromolecules, 
Bellamy & Clarke ( I 9 6 8 ) . I f t h i s i s accepted, then once a 
mechanism f o r the f i x a t i o n of l i g h t energy had evolved, the 
process of e v o l u t i o n was set i n motion. The evolving system. 
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t h a t i s the t o t a l system, npt the i n d i v i d u a l , population nor 
gene p o o l , but the biosphere, moving towards a s t a t e of 
maximum degradation of the energy incident upon i t . 
The dogma of e v o l u t i o n should not be s u r v i v a l , i t should 
be p o t e n t i a l . Not the s u r v i v a l of the f i t t e s t , but the f a c t 
t h a t a l l the time there i s p o t e n t i a l (eg. incident energy or 
biogeochemicals) which are unused or which could be used more 
e f f i c i e n t l y , then there i s the 'drive' f o r e v o l u t i o n to make 
use of t h a t p o t e n t i a l . 
The f a c t t h a t the e f f i c i e n c y of photosynthesis appears 
to be pegged at around 1.6%, Meyer et a l (I96O), p o i n t s to 
the f a c t t h a t e v o l u t i o n has not yet produced a more e f f i c i e n t 
system. The reason f o r t h i s could be e i t h e r t h a t i t has 
f a i l e d t o evolve the necessary c o n t r o l of a more e f f i c i e n t 
system or t h a t the p o t e n t i a l of'the dependant l i v i n g process 
is: l i m i t e d by f a c t o r s other than the capture of energy. The 
apparent 'conservatism' of e v o l u t i o n at the l e v e l of f u n c t i o n a l 
biochemistry borne out by, 
(1) the f a c t t h a t many of the important c o n s t i t u e n t s 
of metabolic pathways are common t o a l l organisms, and 
(2) the discovery of the b u i l d i n g blocks of key organic 
molecules i n pre-cambrian rocks almost p o i n t s t o the immuta-
b i l i t y of the most important features of evolving organisms. 
A more l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n might be th a t the f u l l p o t e n t i a l 
of the metabolic pathways even at t h i s l e v e l of i n e f f i c i e n c y 
has not yet been r e a l i s e d by the e v o l u t i o n a r y process, and 
thus there i s no selective, advantage i n more e f f i c i e n t 
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metabolic systems. 
E v o l u t i o n must th e r e f o r e be considered as the process by 
which more space both h o r i z o n t a l l y and v e r t i c a l l y has been 
e x p l o i t e d by the l i v i n g process thus i n t e r c e p t i n g and using 
a greater amount of the i n c i d e n t energy. This has required 
movement from the sea onto the land, the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of 
members of the food web, primary producers., herbivores, 
c a r n i v o r e s , decomposers, p a r a s i t e s , e t c . , Odum (1956). The 
development of xeromorphs, heliophytes, sciophytes, of t r o p h i c 
and n a s t i c movements, and of the arboreal and epiphytic 
h a b i t a t s . The e v o l u t i o n of s t r u c t u r e d u n i t s and c o n t r o l l e d 
systems at a l l l e v e l s from the s u b - c e l l u l a t to the ecosystem, 
each p l a y i n g an important i n t e g r a t e d r o l e i n the whole process. 
We cannot i s o l a t e the process of speciation from the over-
a l l process of e v o l u t i o n of the biosphere. Odum's d e f i n i t i o n 
of ecosystem i s of i n t e r e s t i n t h i s context:-
"Any area o f nature that- includes l i v i n g organisms 
and non-living: substances i n t e r a c t i n g to produce 
an exchange of materials between the l i v i n g and 
the n o n - l i v i n g p a r t s i s an ecosystem" Odum (19S4). 
\¥ith appropriate m o d i f i c a t i o n t h i s i s equally w e l l a 
d e f i n i t i o n of an organism, an ecosystem or the biosphere. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o remember the e a r l y acceptance by c e r t a i n 
ecologists t h a t ecosystems could be regarded as quasi-organisms., 
Clements (1928). This view was str o n g l y challenged and f e l l 
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from favour. However more r e c e n t l y w i t h the actual measurement 
of the rates and l e v e l s of exchanges of energy and biogeo-
chemicals, P h i l l i p s o n (1966), the concept i s once again coming 
i n t o favour, o^ r at l e a s t i t i s being r e a l i s e d that ecosystems 
and organisms are amenable t o the same type of study, 
Duvigneaud et a l (1970). E v o l u t i o n i s one process but i t i s 
comprehendable at a number of l e v e l s . 
Darwinism has focussed the a t t e n t i o n of biology on one 
l e v e l , the d i v e r s i t y of organisms. Neo-Darwinism attempts 
to understand the process of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n by study of the 
gene poo l s . E v o l u t i o n has thus tended to be regarded as a 
f u n c t i o n of a s p e c i a l i s e d p a r t of the whole system. 
Henderson (1913) perhaps came closest t o the idea of 
e v o l u t i o n as a sin g l e u n i f i e d process i n h i s statement 
"Darwinian f i t n e s s i s compounded of a mutual r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the organism and the environment. Of t h i s , f i t n e s s 
of the environment i s q u i t e as e s s e n t i a l a component as the 
fi t n e s s : which a r i s e s i n the process of organic e v o l u t i o n " . 
His; book d e t a i l s the components of the earth's crust (geo-
chemicals) which are f i t t e d t o and hence are f i t f o r the l i v i n g 
process. The basic argument i n i t s crudest terms i s that i f 
arsenic had been more abundant i n the earth's crust then 
e v o l u t i o n o f the l i v i n g s t a t e would e i t h e r not have 'happened', 
or would have, 'happened' i n a d i f f e r e n t way, perhjips producing 
d i f f e r e n t forms. Henderson thus focussed a t t e n t i o n on the 
importance o f the l i v i n g s t a t e . 
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Eecently ecology has begun t o regard d i v e r s i t y as an 
important f e a t u r e of ecosystems, Margalef (1968), the 
maturing ecosystem ( c f . evol-ving) passes t o a state of greater 
d i v e r s i t y and greater s t a b i l i t y . C a l c u l a t i o n of the e c o l o g i s t ' s 
i n d i c e s o f d i v e r s i t y are u s u a l l y based on the basic u n i t s of 
the Linnean system of nomenclature, the species, t h a t i s 
the end product of the Darwinian process. Such indices are 
meaningfull only i f Gause's P r i n c i p l e t h a t no two species 
can occupy the same e c o l o g i c a l niche, Gause (1961+), holds 
t r u e . Only then do the evolved d i f f e r e n c e s between species 
have any f u n c t i o n a l meaning v i/ithin the ecosystem.-
The forms (phenotypes) which b i o l o g i s t s study are no more 
than 'screens' between the basic s i m i l a r i t i e s of a l l organisms, 
the l i v i n g s t a t e . Ling (1962) (as yet undefined),, and the 
environment. Part of the i n f o r m a t i o n o f each gene pool 
r e l a t e s t o the l i v i n g s t a t e , the biochemistry which is; basic 
t o the m a j o r i t y o f organisms of a l l phyla. The accrued 
evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h i s has changed very l i t t l e and thus 
has survived through time. The r e s t of the information i n 
the gene pool r e l a t e s t o the 'phenotypic screen', i t i s t h i s 
p a r t of the i n f o r m a t i o n which i s changing. 
I n f o r m a t i o n . Change and the Organism 
I n the e v o l u t i o n a r y process, the zygote of each i n d i v i d u a l 
w i t h i n the gene pool contains a l l the. genetic information 
r e l a t i n g t o the l i v i n g s t ate and i t s expression through the 
phenotypic screen. Development goes hand i n hand w i t h 
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r e p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , but during embryogenesis 
more and more o f t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s rendered redundant as 
c e l l s are 'moved i n t o p o s i t i o n s ' where they perform s p e c i f i c 
f u n c t i o n s , Driesch (lf37). The higher up the evolutionary 
scale, sensu Darwin, the greater i s the amount of redundant 
i n f o r m a t i o n present i n the i n d i v i d u a l at m a t u r i t y . I n the 
same way the higher up the e v o l u t i o n a r y scale, the greater 
i s the r e s t r i c t i o n and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of reproductive 
s t r u c t u r e s and at l e a s t i n the animal kingdom the less i s 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of regeneration of l o s t p a r t s . 
This e v o l u t i o n a r y s p e c i a l i z a t i o n goes hand i n hand v/ith 
a l l e v i a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i o n of h a b i t a t . D e f i n i t i o n of h a b i t a t 
i s of key importance f o r the f o l l o w i n g reason. The pro-
c a r y o t i c organisms without doubt are found i n the greatest 
d i v e r s i t y of h a b i t a t , being found from the t r o p i c a l seas t o 
the edge of the p o l a r and alpine ice deserts. Within each 
h a b i t a t they are r e s t r i c t e d , or at l e a s t t h e i r p e riod of 
growth and development i s r e s t r i c t e d , t o those areas or 
periods when f r e e water i s present. 
The major f a c t o r s l i m i t i n g the ' l i v i n g s t a t e ' and hence 
f a c i n g the e v o l u t i o n a r y process are the l i m i t a t i o n s imposed 
by the environment, l i g h t , temperature, atmosphere, water, 
Lundegardh (l93l )o The various forms we study, the phenotypic 
screens, are the successes of e v o l u t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o these 
f a c t o r s and t o these f a c t o r s as modified by other b i o t a . Evol-
u t i o n i s the process whereby the p o t e n t i a l of the environment 
i s ' e x p l o i t e d ' by the l i v i n g s t a t e . This i s accomplished by 
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environmental screening by the phenotype. The 'st r u g g l e ' , 
whether a c t i v e or passive, i s not f o r existence, i f i t v/ere 
the p r o c a r y o t i c organisms would r e i g n supreme or b e t t e r s t i l l 
some super organism would be found. The 'struggle' i s f o r 
maximum expression .of l i f e , maximum f l o w of energy. 
The process of e v o l u t i o n i s a composite of two p a r t s , 
(a) increase of the l i v i n g s t a t e on ea r t h , i n essence 
increased c y c l i n g of biogeochemicals, and 
(b) an increase i n the d i v e r s i t y of the phenotsrpic screen adap-
t i n g t o , and overcoming, the environmental l i m i t a t i o n s . 
Energy i s the 'prime mover', the p o t e n t i a l , the opportunity 
f o r increase of ' l i f e ' . N a t u ral s e l e c t i o n i s the mechanism 
which 'siezes' t h a t o p p o r t u n i t y . 
R e c a p i t u l a t i o n 
As the e a r t h cooled chemical systems came i n t o existence 
and the elements and compounds, now found i n the earth's 
c r u s t , (geochemicals) were formed. As cooling continued, 
compounds l i k e water were able to e x i s t i n the l i q u i d state 
and the hydrosphere came i n t o being. At some point i n the 
l a t t e r p a r t o f the earth's h i s t o r y (v/hen the temperature 
environment was low enough to support the existence of 
macromolecules), chemical systems developed which were capable 
of s e l f - r e p l i c a t i o n . The energy necessary f o r the process of 
synthesis being derived from oxidation-reduction r e a c t i o n s . 
The main c o n s t i t u e n t s of these new chemical systems were 
C, N, 0, H, P and S which together w i t h varying amounts of 
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many of the other chemicals of the earth's crust were entrained 
i n t o the process and a new glo b a l system, a system of biogeo-
chemicalacycling, was i n i t i a t e d , the energy necessary f o r the 
c y c l i n g being derived from the sun. Evo l u t i o n was thus set 
i n motion, a process through v/hich the l i v i n g chemicals were 
to be ' c a r r i e d ' t o every p a r t of the globe where water 
e x i s t s as a l i q u i d and where geochemicals are a v a i l a b l e to 
t h a t l i q u i d medium. 
The u n i t of e v o l u t i o n i s the u n i t of biogeochemical 
c y c l i n g , organism, ecosystem, biosphere. The l i m i t a t i o n i s 
the f i r s t raw m a t e r i a l u s u a l l y a geochemical which becomes 
i n short supply and hence l i m i t s the l i v i n g process ( c f . 
l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s , Odum (1956)) . E v o l u t i o n can then respond 
by producing a system.which overcomes t h i s l i m i t a t i o n . 
This response can e i t h e r be at the l e v e l of the organism 
through biochemical or b i o p h y s i c a l e v o l u t i o n , or at the l e v e l 
of the ecosystem by recruitment of some organism i n t o i t s 
food or decomposer chains which uses or recycles the l i m i t i n g 
geochemical more e f f i c i e n t l y . 
The zonation of the t e r r e s t r i a l ecosystem on a world 
scale i n r e l a t i o n t o macroclimte'.both w i t h respect to a l t i t u d e 
and l a t i t a d e , Tundra, Taiga, Deciduous f o r e s t , e t c . , in d i c a t e s 
t h a t the main l i m i t i n g f a c t o r i s growth period which i s mainly 
c o n t r o l l e d by temperature o f t e n a c t i n g through water and hence 
n u t r i e n t supply. 
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The presence of sp e c i a l i s e d ecosystems, sand dunes, s a l t -
marshes, reedswamps, e t c . , w i t h i n a l l the major vegetation 
b e l t s of the wor l d , Dauhenmire (19U7)» points to the l i m i t a t i o n s 
placed on the process of e v o l u t i o n hy extreme .environments. 
Ho?/ever the t h e o r i e s of succession and climax, whether mono-, 
Glements(l928), of p o l y - , Tansley (1939), as yet n e i t h e r 
proven or disproven, i n d i c a t e t h a t given time even these 
l i m i t a t i o n s can he i n p a r t overcome. 
Modern developments i n ecology stemming from Lindemann 
(19^2) which are aimed at measuring the p r o d u c t i v i t y of 
l i v i n g systems i n r e l a t i o n to hiogeochemical csycsling allov/s 
at l e a s t some e m p i r i c a l appraisal of t h i s . Comparative" dsta 
f o r the p r o d u c t i v i t y o f the climax systems developed hy the 
process of succession i n three c o n t r a s t i n g h a h i t a t s i n one 
c l i m a t i c region i s given i n Table 1. The three h a b i t a t s 
and'climax'forest systems are:-
(1) Mixed oak woodland on a l l u v i a l s o i l , 
(2) B i r c h woodlands as the te r m i n a l phase i n hydroseral 
development i n a drainage lake which received during 
i t s development mineral supply from the ground water 
d r a i n i n g through i t . 
(3) Pine woodland developed on peat which terminated the 
process of succession i n a seepage lake. The mineral 
supply t o the climax system being derived s o l e l y 
from the rain¥/ater f a l l i n g d i r e c t l y on the -system. 
That i s the climax system i s i s o l a t e d from the supply 
of n u t r i e n t s from the parent siabstrate or mineral 
. s o i l s . 
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Data from Rodin & B a z e l i v i c h (196?) and Reichle (l970) 
TABLE 1 P r o d u c t i v i t y and Nitrogen Uptake 
of three Climax Systems 
Climax Ecosystem Mixed B i r c h Pine 
Type Deciduous. 
N:et Annual 
p r o d u c t i o n IhkO 750 62 
gms/dry wt. 
Nitrogen uptake 
gms (annual) 12 6 0.5 
Production/ 
N i t r o g e n uptake 120 125 12h 
The production f i g u r e s speak f o r themselves i n d i c a t i n g 
the l i m i t e d p o t e n t i a l of the more extreme environment. The 
f i g u r e s r e l a t i n g t o n i t r o g e n uptake are of i n t e r e s t in t h a t 
they i n d i c a t e t h a t not only i s n i t r o g e n l i m i t i n g t o the 
process, hut t h a t at l e a s t at the l e v e l of the climax system 
there i s a f i x e d r e l a t i o n s h i p hetween a h i o t i c and b i o t i c 
p o t e n t i a l . I n a l l three a c e r t a i n amount of n i t r o g e n g i v i n g 
r i s e t o the same amount of production of hiomass, A l o t . 
more accurate data of t h i s type i s necessary hefore such 
deductions can he regarded as anything more than w i l d 
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s p e c u l a t i o n . I t i s hoped tha t the I n t e r n a t i o n a l B i o l o g i c a l 
Programme w i l l provide meaningfull data on the required 
extensive scale. 
However i n the l i g h t of the foregoing discussions i t 
would seem v a l i d t o suggest th a t the concept of n a t u r a l 
s e l e c t i o n and s u r v i v a l of the f i t t e s t supported hy the concept 
of e x p l o i t a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l would give a b e t t e r understanding 
of e v o l u t i o n , and hence of b i o l o g y . Perhaps stated together 
as f o l l o w s " e v o l u t i o n i s the process by which the f u l l p o t e n t i a l 
of the l i v i n g s t a t e on e a r t h i s r e a l i s e d through n a t u r a l 
s e l e c t i o n , the whole system moving to a s t a t e of maximum 
degradation of' energy i n compliance w i t h the laws of thermo-
dynamics". 
I t i s suggested t h a t t h i s statement approaches the 
d e f i n i t i o n of a general system f o r biology i n that i t 
(1) attempts t o accomodate the more recent knov^ledge r e l a t i n g 
t o the l i v i n g s t a t e , (Knowledge which has been expressed i n 
statements l i k e " I n my philosophy there i s but one l i v i n g 
matter t h a t has overgrown t h i s globe's surface, taken up 
d i f f e r e n t shapes, s i z e s , complexities and colours, adapting 
i t s e l f t o the various conditions" Szent-Gyttrgy, (196O)), 
(2) attempts to r e l a t e knowledge o f a l l systems from the 
molecular t o the biospherio. ^ffliether the laws of thermodynamics 
as applied are i n r e a l i t y the elementary p r o p e r t i e s of matter, 
the importance of the acceptance and v e r i f i c a t i o n of which 
v/ere i n d i c a t e d by Borel (1956) (see i n t r o d u c t i o n ) , i s 
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u n f o r t u n a t e l y impossible to say. 
The dilemma of acceptance of any one concept, any one 
system, as shown i n sections 1 and 2 of the t h e s i s , and i n 
the Appendix i s s t i l l w i t h us and i s best summarised by the 
o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n i n the preface. I f i t i s possible to con-
cep t u a l i s e not,the faces nor the vase but the composite 
p i c t u r e of faces and vase then i t i s possible t.o have a 
(deductive) general system. 
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APPENDIX 1 AN APPROACH THROUGH LOGIC 
Philosophy i s the p u r s u i t of knowledge of things and 
t h e i r causes. Science i s systematic and formulated knov/ledge. 
Logic i s the science of reasoning. 
I n l o g i c the s t r u c t u r e or order whether displayed oif 
conceptualised i s c a l l e d the form. The p a r t i c u l a r medium 
t h a t displays a form i s c a l l e d the content, t h i s may be 
p h y s i c a l , a u d i t o r y , t a c t i l e , e t c . The act of considering a 
p a r t i c u l a r form apart from i t s content i s c a l l e d a b s t r a c t i o n 
and the symbolizing of i t by name i s c a l l e d the act of 
conc e p t u a l i s i n g . The concept of any form i s the manner i n 
which i t i s put together w i t h no reference t o the content. 
Concept i s a component of elements and r e l a t i o n s . 
( B i o l o g i c a l l y i t must be remembered t h a t form can only 
be appreciated by an i n d i v i d u a l through the channels, a u d i t o r y , 
v i s u a l , t a c t i l e t h a t the human species has evolved i n 
r e l a t i o n t o h i s environment and t o the store of knowledge 
t h a t i n d i v i d u a l has aquired through a period of contact w i t h 
t h a t environment. 
We must accept t h a t when anyone sees a c i r c l e , he sees 
a c i r c l e , t h i s is. an evolved c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , communication of 
the f a c t t h a t he has seen the c i r c l e (form) to another 
i n d i v i d u a l who has not seen i t and i s incapable of seeing i t 
i s t h e problem. Here l o g i c must take over the r o l e of the 
evolved r e c e p t o r . ) 
39 
C e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s can hold one, two or more elements 
together, i e . 'between' i s a r e l a t i o n which requires three 
elements to be complete, 
c f . I am between the t a b l e and the c h a i r . 
Elements-I, t a b l e and c h a i r , relation-between 
I t must be noted t h a t the whole could be regarded as a single 
form and could be used as such as an element i n another r e l a t i o n , 
The numberi:!;;; of elements a r e l a t i o n requires so that i t s 
expression i s complete i s c a l l e d the a d i c i t y of the r e l a t i o n . 
A statement t h a t asserts t h a t : -
(a) a r e l a t i o n i s i n d i c a t e d , 
(b) the r e q u i r e d number of elements are present, 
( c ) the r e l a t i o n p l u s the elements assert themselves, that i s , 
t h a t the r e l a t i o n holds regarding the elements being r e l a t e d , 
i s c a l l e d a p r o p o s i t i o n . Whitehead & Russel (1967), or 
sentence. Tarski (l9Ul)« P r o p o s i t i o n v i ? l l l be used throughout, 
t h i s work. 
An example of a p r o p o s i t i o n i s as follows.: 
The car i s red.. 
The man has brov/n h a i r . 
To avoid the confusion t h a t i s encountered when verbal 
forms (phonograms) are used, ideographic symbols are used i n 
t h e i r place. • -IT: 
phonogram - The car i s red. 
ideogram - The car - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a. 
red - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n b. 
i s - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c. 
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Thus, the ideogram a b c replaces "The car i s red". 
The power of c l a r i t y e x h i b i t e d by the use of ideo-
graphic symbols becomes apparent i n the f o l l o w i n g example:-
phonogram - I played games w i t h the boys, 
ideogram - Prom stated knowledge l e t us assume 
th a t the number of boys i s f o u r . 
I - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a. 
; boys - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n b c d e 
played games w i t h - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a 
Therefore: 
a a ( b + c + d + e ) 
a a b a a d 
a cx c a a e 
a a b (c + d + e) 
a a c (b + d + e) 
a a d (b + c + e) 
a a e (b + .c + d) 
Thus, vtfithin the phonogram " I played games w i t h the 
boys", i s telescoped a number of possible propositions (forms) 
a a ( b + c + d + e ) - I played games w i t h ( a l l 
of the boys combining as a group to challenge me). 
a a b) 
a a c) 
- I played games w i t h ( a l l the boys 
a a d) 
sep a r a t e l y ) . 
a a e) 
a a b (c + d + e) - I played games w i t h ( a l l 
Ul 
of the boys where ONE has the backing and guidance of a l l 
the r e s t , thus producing a superior p l a y e r ) . 
I t i s t h i s telescoping of possible propositions t h a t 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s A r i s t o t l e l l a n l o g i c w i t h i t s use o f , (a) 
phonograms, and (b) reduction of a l l phonograms t o fundamental 
subject-predicate r e l a t i o n s h i p s , i e , a l l statements are 
reduced to ' i s ' form, as compared t o Symbolic (or mathematical) 
l o g i c , w i t h i t s use of symbols to designate (a) elements (the 
p a r t s t h a t are being r e l a t e d to each o t h e r ) , and (b) r e l a t i o n s 
( t h e c e r t a i n something t h a t holds the elements t o g e t h e r ) . 
I n any t r a i n of thought, elements and r e l a t i o n s are not 
u n i t e d i n a random f a s h i o n . Certain elements are u n i t e d by 
c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s . For example:-
I swam the lake 
I ate the lake. 
I drank the lake 
I grew the lake 
elements: I , the lake 
r e l a t i o n s : swam, ate, drank, grew 
I t becomes c l e a r t h a t only c e r t a i n elements and r e l a t i o n s 
can be considered as abiding w i t h one another. 
A group t h a t i s formed when:. 
(a) a r e l a t i o n plus a l l the possible meaningful elements 
t h a t may be used; 
(b) elements plus a l l the possible r e l a t i o n s t h a t may 
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be introduced; 
i s c a l l e d a context. By t r a n s l a t i n g (a) i n the above sentence 
i n t o an example, f u r t h e r terminologies of discourse can be 
introduced. For example:-
elements: f i v e people a b o d e 
r e l a t i o n s : t o the l e f t of = i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
Therefore: 
a a b 
b a c 
c a d , e t c . 
Each one of the above ensembles of two elem.ents plus a 
r e l a t i o n produces an elementary p r o p o s i t i o n (form, ordeic-^. 
The subscript 2 enforces the knowledge t h a t , t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
r e l a t i o n r e q u i r e s two elements f o r i t s completion. Whether 
o.r not each and every elementary p r o p o s i t i o n i s v a l i d i s 
determined by i n f o r m a t i o n (a p r i o r i ) t h a t i s stated beforehand 
as being t r u t h . 
That i s : a a b i s t r u e 
b a c i s t r u e 
Therefore: c a b i s f a l s e 
b a a i s f a l s e 
Therefore, w i t h c e r t a i n knowledge of a few of the elementary 
p r o p o s i t i o n s , the t r u t h value of others are s u t o m a t i c a l l y 
f i x e d . 
The l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s 
which permit the "automatic f i x i n g of t r u t h values of others" 
are as f o l l o w s : 
1+3 
(a) l y the use of the word • "and"' a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n or 
conjunction or .joint a s sertive between elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s 
i s created. 
a a b and b a c ther e f o r e a a c 
The symbol t h a t u s u a l l y expresses•"and" i s "." 
Thus?y; the p r o p o s i t i o n r e w r i t t e n : 
a a b , b a c th e r e f o r e a a c 
(b) The d i s j u n c t i o n of elementary propositions by the 
as s e r t i o n of :- (a) " e i t h e r " one "or" the other 
(b) or "both" 
That l a : e i t h e r a a b or b a a i s f a l s e 
or both a a b or b a a i s f a l s e . 
That i s : (a a b) V (b cx a) (V = d i s j u n c t i v e r e l a t i o n -
s h i p ) . 
I f a a b i s stated as being t r u e , thensb a a, by f a c t 
or i m p l i c a t i o n or p r e c l u s i o n . i s known to be f a l s e . 
Z> The symbole> i s used t o I n d i c a t e : i m p l i c a t i o n or 
p r e c l u s i o n . 
Therefore: (a d b) ( b a a ) 
The symbol before any elementary p r o p o s i t i o n means the 
f o l l o w i n g : 
(b a a) ) 
b a a f a i l s ) A l l mean the same 
I t i s f a l s e t h a t b a a ) t h i n g 
Thus, once the elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s are formed from 
the given context of elements and r e l a t i o n s , the three 
r e l a t i o n s t h a t e x i s t among elementary propositions are 
employed. 
The three r e l a t i o n s (a) Conjunctive "." 
(b) D i s j u n c t i v e "V" 
(c) I m p l i c a t i o n or p r e c l u s i o n ">" 
are c a l l e d by many l o g i c i a n s " l o g i c a l constants". 
W i t h i n the l i m i t s of a given context (elements and 
r e l a t i o n s ) , elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s are formed. With the 
implementation of the l o g i c a l constant between the given 
elementary p r o p o s i t i o n , p l u s the t r u t h value of c e r t a i n 
elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s ( i n the above-mentioned given 
c o n t e x t ) , a process has been p a r t i a l l y i n s t i t u t e d . Such 
a process taken t o i t s completion produces a system. 
Thus, a system i s produced as f o l l o w s : 
(a) Elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s formed from a given 
context (of elements and r e l a t i o n s ) . -
(b) Prestated t r u t h values regarding c e r t a i n 
elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s are s t a t e d . 
(c ) I n the l i g h t of the given information the elementary 
p r o p o s i t i o n s are r e l a t e d t o each other using the l o g i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s of c o n j u n c t i o n , d i s j u n c t i o n , i m p l i c a t i o n , thus, 
producing a s t r u c t u r e where a l l elementary propositions acquire 
a t r u t h value of " t r u t h " or " f a l l a c y " , thus producing a 
system. 
Certa i n systems wherein 
(a) the t r u t h values of a few elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s 
were given as 'known' 
(b) w i t h the use of the l o g i c a l constant the t r u t h 
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or f a l l a c y of a l l the other elementary propositions w i t h i n 
a given context can be i m p l i e d , i s c a l l e d a deductive system. 
Certai n other systems which req u i r e known information 
about each and every elementary p r o p o s i t i o n , before the t r u t h 
value can be assigned to a l l of the elementary propositions 
w i t h i n a given context, i s c a l l e d an induc t i v e Isystem. 
Misconceptions abound i n number as t o the r e l a t i o n 
between deductive and i n d u c t i v e systems. The oyitstandlng 
example of one such e r r o r I s the general view that deductive 
and I n d u c t i v e systems are two separate e n t i t i e s of study 
and a p p l i c a t i o n . Nothing could be f u r t h e r from the t r u t h 
as the f o l l o w i n g examples w i l l i l l u s t r a t e : 
(a) 1. A l l men have beards, 
2. John i s a man. 
3. John has a beard. 
(b) 1. Ann i s i l l . 
2. Ann i s i n bed. 
3. Ann w i l l not p l a y w i t h her f r i e n d s today. 
(a) represents a deductive system, whereas (b) represents an 
I n d u c t i v e system. The outstanding d i f f e r e n c e s between (a) and 
(b) i s t h a t the t h i r d p r o p o s i t i o n i n (a) i s implied diipectly by 
the f i r s t two p r o p o s i t i o n s of ( a ) . (Por the sake of c l a r i t y , ' 
I w i l l c a l l the f i r s t two pr o p o s i t i o n s premises, and the t h i r d 
p r o p o s i t i o n the conclusion.) 
Thus, i n (a) (deductive system) the conclusion i s d i r e c t l y 
i m p l i e d by the premises. Whereas i n (b) ( i n d u c t i v e system) 
he 
the conclusion was not d i r e c t l y implied by the premises of 
(b).. The conclusion of (b) i s implied by the premises of 
( b ) , but the i m p l i c a t i o n i s one of degree. 
Thus, the d i f f e r e n c e between a deductive system and an. 
i n d u c t i v e system i s one of degree. Degree, of v/hat? 
Degree of s t r e n g t h of i m p l i c a t i o n between the elementary 
p r o p o s i t i o n s i n a given context. 
I f , as i n Example (a) A l l men have beards. 
John i s a man. 
John has a beard. 
(Let i t be assumed at t h i s p o i n t , unless otherwise declared, 
that, the given p r o p o s i t i o n s i and 2 of (a) and (b) are t r u e ) , 
the elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s as so r e l a t e d t h a t the i m p l i -
c a t i o n i s d i r e c t and n o , f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n i s needed i n 
support of the i m p l i c a t i o n s , the system i s deductive. ( I t 
must be noted t h a t f u r t h e r information i s needed. Such 
i n f o r m a t i o n ' i s needed t o substantiate>the i n i t i a l f a c t u a l 
claims of 1 and 2. Discussion as to t h i s p o i n t w i l l be 
found f u r t h e r i n t o the body of t h i s discourse). 
I n Example (b) Ann i s i l l . 
Ami i s i n bed. 
Ann w i l l not p l a y w i t h her f r i e n d s today, 
the elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s are i m p l i e d to one another but 
not d i r e c t l y . The premises substantiate the d e c l a r a t i o n 
of the conclusion (the t h i r d p r o p o s i t i o n ) only t o a l i m i t e d 
hi 
degree. The support provided by the premises of (a) 
(deductive system) i s d i r e c t and complete. To Increase 
the s t r e n g t h of i m p l i c a t i o n s between the propositions of 
( b ) , f u r t h e r information i s needed. Such information comes 
i n the form of an Increase i n number of given p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
The degree of st r e n g t h of i m p l i c a t i o n between elementary 
p r o p o s i t i o n s may be viewed as f o l l o w s : 
Deductive 
Increase i n the str e n g t h i n d u c t i v e 
of i m p l i c a t i o n between the 
p r o p o s i t i o n s provided by 
any given defined context. 
Meaningless 
(Thus, dn a d d i t i o n t o being a "study of a l l manner of order", 
l o g i c deals i n great depth w i t h the strength of such an 
o r d e r ) . 
The concept t h a t deals w i t h the strength of substan-
t i a t i o n (support or i m p l i c a t i o n ) i s c a l l e d i n d u c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y . 
(The general term p r o b a b i l i t y i s used i n many t e x t s , but the 
term lacks c l a r i t y of use. This lack of c l a r i t y becomes 
apparent when the discussion regarding "information lieeded ^  
to s u b s t a n t i a t e the i n i t i a l f a c t u a l claims", mentioned 
p r e v i o u s l y i s de a l t w i t h ) . 
Thus, the i n d u c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y of the elementary 
p r o p o s i t i o n s of a given context I s : -
the degree of support 
or the st r e n g t h of the support 
or the strength of s u b s t a n t i a t i o n 
or the degree of i m p l i c a t i o n 
t h a t e x i s t s amongst a l l the elementary propositions produced 
from a given context. 
The consideration of the tr m t h values ( i . e . whether 
the p r o p o s i t i o n i s t r u e or f a l s e ) of premises found i n 
examples (a) (deductive) and (b^ ( i n d u c t i v e ) systems, i s of 
the utmost importance. 
Up t o t h i s p o i n t i n the discourse, i t has been assumed 
t h a t the premises ( o r elementary p r o p o s i t i o n s ) possessed the 
t r u t h values - t r u e . Such assumptions are without merit 
unless they (the premises) themselves, are substantiated. 
A clo s e r examination of Example (a) w i l l i l l u s t r a t e the 
problem.. 
1. A l l men have beards. 
2. John i s a man. 
3. John has a beard. 
1 and 2 i m p l i e d d i r e c t l y t h a t 3 i s so ( t r u e ) . But are 1 
and 2 so ( t r u e ) ? 
Thus, the premise 1 " A l l men have beards" can only be 
t r u e i f 1 i s i t s e l f a conclusion to another set of propositions 
known as premises.: 
i . e . premise - Statement ( a ) , 
premise - Statement ( b ) . 
conclusion - " A l l men have beards". 
The same applies t o the premise 2 "John i s a man": 
i . e . premise -Statement ( a ) , 
premise - Statement ( b ) . 
conclusion - "John i s a man". 
Thus: 
premise - Statement ( a ) , 
premise - Statement (b)'. 
Conclusion - A l l men have beards. 
premise - Statement ( a ) , 
premise - Statement ( b ) . 
conclusion - John i s a man. 
premise - A l l men have beards, 
premise - John i s a man. 
conclusion - John hasaa beard.. 
Thus;, the support of premises i s determined by personal 
kno7/ledge or eplstemepof the person who happens to be 
perusing the i n i t i a l premise. The f a c t u a l personal know-
ledge ( o r episteme) i n r e l a t i o n to the given premises: 
A l l . men have beards. 
John i s a man.; 
immediately produces the problem of degree of s u b s t a n t i a t i o n . 
The degree of s u b s t a n t i a t i o n t h a t e x i s t s between the 
f a c t u a l knowledge and the given premises i s c a l l e d the 
eiastme p r o b a b i l i t y . The degree of support or s u b s t a n t i a t i o n 
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that exists between the given premise and i t s conclusion 
i s called the inductive p r o h a h i l i t y . That i s : 
Factual proposition - premise 1 . A l l men have beards. 
Factual proposition - premise 2 . John i s a man. 
The degree of support provided by the factual proposition 
or knowledge to the v a l i d i t y of the premise 1 and 2 i s called 
the episteme p r o b a b i l i t y . 
The degree of support provided or the amount of 
substantiation provided by the premise to the conclusion, 
i s called the inductive p r o b a b i l i t y , i . e . 
premise 1 . 
Inductive Vremise 2 . 
p r o b a b i l i t y conclusion - John Bias a beard. 
I t i s the p r o b a b i l i t y of the t r u t h of a statement i n 
r e l a t i o n to our stock of relevant knowledge. I f we have a l l 
the relevant knowledge (information) we have a DEDUCTIVE 
SYSTEM. That which we lack, contributes to the episteme 
p r o b a b i l i t y . As Godel'sttheorem ailatjei'^that a mathematical 
system cannot be self descriptive, a l l the rules necessary 
f o r describing the system cannot be stated within the system"* 
An inductive system i s one which accepts improbability, but 
is based on p r o b a b i l i t y . 
This 'excursion' into logic has brought us back to the 
same problem,.the 'no one' i n the Minkowski space/time 
relat i o n s h i p . The delineation of time and space, contained 
and conveyed information, and deduction and induction a l l 
- G-odel i n Newman ( 1 9 6 0 ) 
5 1 
depend on a system of comprehension or interpretation and 
upon certain properties of that system. The main inference 
which can he dravm i s that: - Ahsolute 'deduction' is impossible 
and that a general system can at the best approach deduction 
by attempting to contain a l l the information which relates to 
the system. 
5 2 
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